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1. Introduction   
 
  This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of the micro-structure of a 
technological adoption process by examining the actual decisions made by households in Indonesia. 
In terms of theory, there are three factors which may affect an individual’s decision to adopt a 
technology.  First, the experience of others may affect a person’s technological adoption decision 
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). Second, a new investment may be regarded as a high risk - high 
return activity, and the degree of individual risk aversion will affect the adoption decision.  
Existing studies using experiments (Binswanger, 1980), econometric analysis (Fafchamps and 
Pender, 1997), and area studies (Scott, 1976) have shown that farmers in developing countries are 
typically risk averse.  When risk-averse households are unable to insure themselves against 
income shocks, they tend to shy away from risky activities.  Finally, adopting new technology 
usually involves a large initial investment.  The accessibility of credit markets acts as a decisive 
factor in financing the large fixed cost of a new investment.     
  This paper compares these different factors using empirical data with the aid of a consistent 
theoretical framework.  To this aim, we employ household survey data from the floating net 
aquaculture (hereafter, FN) business that was introduced in villages surrounding a dam reservoir 
constructed in Saguling, Indonesia in 1985.   We interviewed approximately 400 households in the 
villages and collect their retrospective information over a period of 16 years exclusively for this 
study.   Also, following the approach of Binswanger (1980), we conducted investment experiments 
in order to quantify the degree of risk aversion by village members directly. 
  We believe this paper contributes to the existing literature as our analysis is the first to 
examine empirically these three different determinants of household investment behavior in an 
integrated dynamic framework in the context of a developing country.  Our findings show that all 
three of the above hypotheses are verified in the empirical analysis. Moreover, using bivariate 
probit analysis is verified since the coefficient correlation of disturbances is significant. Our 
marginal effect analysis shows that credit constraint and risk attitude critically reduces the  
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probability of adopting the new FN technology. 
 
2.  Village Background     
 
  For the empirical analysis in this paper, we conducted household surveys in the villages 
around Saguling Dam in county Bandung in Indonesia. Saguling dam is located between Jakarta 
and Bandung cities, approximately 30km from Bandung (Figure 1). This dam was constructed in 
1985. For those who were relocated, one of the most important supplementary income sources was 
floating net aquaculture (FN).  FN brought some economic benefits to the local people, but 
required financial and physical investments by households to implement it.  This was the first 
large-scale implementation of the floating net cage technique in Indonesia, and very few people 
started FN in the beginning since the FN were totally new to the local people (Costa-Pierce and 
Soemarwoto ed., 1990). However, early pioneers attended the training sessions and started FN 
around 1986. Subsequently it diffused rapidly in Saguling, and by 1995 FN had expanded to 20 
locations in Saguling. However, there is some controversy as to whether the project was beneficial 
overall to the resettled people or the poor, and many questions have been raised.  Hence, it is 
important to carefully identify the factors that produced successful FN investments. 
 
3.  The Model Framework    
    
    We will employ a quantitative analysis of the structure of FN investments in order to make a 
formal assessment of relative importance of these different determinants.  The first step is to 
construct an integrated theoretical model of FN investments.  Then we will test statistically the 
restrictions derived from the theory. 
When there are two investment opportunities, one with high risk and high return and the other with 
low risk and low return, a household’s attitude toward risk matters.   A risk-averse household will  
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optimally decline a high-risk investment although it can generate a high return if the risks are 
understood and managed properly.  On the other hand, less risk-averse households will undertake 
a profitable investment regardless of its riskiness.     
  Poor households usually have only a limited access to credit markets and are constrained from 
borrowing for a variety of reasons such as high information cost (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or lack 
of assets for collateral (Carter, 1988). The existence of credit constraints has important negative 
impacts on FN investments by poor households, since credit-constrained households cannot afford 
the initial investment required to start up an FN business.   The initial cost with minimum 1 unit is 
at least between 400,000 and 800,000 Rupiah (in late 1980’s)
1, which is more than several months 
income in the area.   Therefore, if there is no credit available, a household will choose not to invest 
in FN. 
  By extending the models developed by Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) and Morduch (1994), we 
construct a simple household model of FN investments which integrates the three determinants 
mentioned above, i.e., social learning, risk aversion, and credit accessibility. We implicitly derive 
the optimal solution to the household’s investment problem of maximization problem of expected 
utility (Miyata and Sawada, 2002) as: 
 
        ]   ,   ,   ; ,   ), ( [   e S R  B 㬰 N p I I* = .        (1) 
 
This equation (1) indicates that the optimal FN investment I* is a function of the probability of the 
high-return state p(N), which depends on the number of successful investors in the network N, 
attitude toward risks g    and credit availability B as well as returns R and S from the investments. 
Note that the probability of the high-return state, p(N), can be either a positive or negative function 
of the number of existing successful investors, N.   If it is a positive function, it can be attributed to 
leaning effects from others, i.e., positive social learning.  If saturation effects in FN investments 
are serious, the probability can be a negative function of N. 
                                                   
1 In 1988, an initial investment of Rp 1 million (more or less US $560; US $1 = Rp 1,785, rate at the time of 1988) was  
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  By differentiating the first-order condition for the household problem (Miyata and Sawada, 
2002), we can show that       
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Equation (2) indicates that if there is a positive social learning effect from a network, knowing 
previous successful investors will encourage investments in the new technology, and visa versa.  
Yet, as can be seen from equation (3), adoption of the new technology may depend on risk 
preferences.   Equation (4) demonstrates that access to credit positively affects the extent to which 
risky technologies are adopted (first derived in Proposition 1 of Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989).  
Equation (2), (3), and (4) represent theoretical restrictions which can be examined empirically.   It 
is also easily verified that the credit ceiling does not affect investment decisions when the credit 
constraint is not binding.     
 
4.  Empirical Framework 
   
  In order to set up an empirical model for FN investments, we linearize equation (1) to obtain: 
 
          0 u X B 㬰 N I* B N + + + + + = b a a a a g ,        (5) 
 
where X is a matrix of household characteristics such as household head’s age, household income 
and assets, which is included as a set of control variables. The last term in the right hand side, u, 
denotes a well-behaved error term. Since the resource allocation to FN investments, I*, is 
                                                                                                                                                                        
needed to invest in aquaculture (Costa-Pierce and Soemarwoto, 1990).    
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unobservable latent variable, we employ a binary dependent variable model to estimate equation 
(5).   
 
Investment with Endogenous Credit Constraints 
  Our econometric model is composed of two interrelated probit models—the first probit model 
for FN adoption composes of the binary response model of equations (5). The second probit 
equation is for credit constraint consists of equations (6), (7) and (8) (Jappelli, 1990).  If we 
assume that e  and  u follow standard bivariate normal distribution, then the model becomes a 
version of the bivariate probit model (Greene, 2000): 
 
            0 u X cc 㬰 N I* cc N + + + + + = b a a a a g , 
          v = 1  if    I* > 0,            (5’) 
          v = 0  otherwise. 
             e p + = Z H* ,            (6) 
        cc = 1  if    H* < 0,            (7) 
        cc = 0    otherwise.            (8) 
 
where E(u) = 0 and E(e) = 0.   
  If an unobserved component of the credit constrained variable, e, is systematically correlated 
with unobserved characteristics, u, which influence FN adoption, there will be an endogeneity 
problem.   Hence, to estimate parameters of this model where cov(e, u) „ 0, we employ the full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. (For the details, see Miyata and Sawada, 2002) 
  In equations (5’), (6), (7) and (8), we need to impose the conditions var(e) = 1 and var(u) = 1 
for identification. With the econometric model above, we cope with the endogeneity problem of 
credit constraints explicitly. Since the estimated coefficients of the results do not reflect the 
magnitude of each variable, we estimate marginal effects to examine the degree of the independent 
variables’ influences on the likelihood of FN adoption (Greene, 2002).   
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5.  Data  
   
  From previous household-level surveys, the average income of households in these villages 
was determined to be 300,000 to 400,000 Rupiah (Rp) (approximately US23.5 to 51 dollars) per 
month, although many were well below this range (Miyata, 2003). This income level is around the 
poverty line and it is considered poor by international standards
2.   The first village (Village A) 
was chosen because an individual pioneer had implemented FN early and village A had become one 
of the most active FN villages. Village B was much less active and was chosen for comparison 
purposes.  400 households were selected by random sample within three different wealth strata
3.         
The village head and local government officers in each village categorized all households into three 
groups; rich, middle, and poor, based on their subjective assessments of each household’s asset 
ownership, income, and occupation. These households were interviewed individually so that we 
could collect their FN investment behavior and socio-economic information between 1985 and 
2000.  In order to gather direct information about a given household’s risk attitudes, we used a 
refined version of a stochastic investment game. Detailed procedures of our experiments, 
econometric specifications and our estimation results of risk aversion functions are summarized in 
Miyata (2003).         
 
Variables       
  As control variables to estimate our investment equation, i.e., a set of variables, X, in equation 
(5’), we include various household physical and human asset variables.  Specifically, these 
independent variables are the number of members of the household (Num_hh), the age of the 
respondent (Age),  the years of schooling for the most educated member of the household 
                                                   
2  Poverty line in rural Indonesia estimated roughly between 74000Rp and 81200Rp per person. 
3  The village head and local government officers in each village categorized all households into three groups; rich, 
middle, and poor, based on their subjective assessments of each household’s asset ownership, income, and occupation.    
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(High_edu), the footprint of the house in 100 square meters (Hslnd100), farm land in 100 square 
meters (Farm100), and the monthly income (in million Rp) (Income).   
  The dummy variable FN takes 1 if the respondent is engaging in FN aquaculture and 0 if not. 
Village is 1 for households from village A and 0 for village B. Resettle is 1 if the household was 
resettled due to the construction of the Saguling Dam. Risk is the risk aversion coefficient obtained 
from the experimental results in 2000. CC dummy takes 1 if the household is credit constrained, 
and 0 otherwise.  FN training  dummy takes 1 if the household has ever received aquaculture 
training in the past, and 0 if not. Success is the number of successful FN owners the household 
knew when it adopted FN. 
  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of these dependent and independent variables used in 
our estimation.  Note that Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the pooled data from 1985 to 
2000. The respondents have an average of 6 years of schooling. The mean of ‘highest years of 
education’ is higher than the average respondent’s education, implying that their children may have 
a higher level of education than the respondent. The other personal characteristics such as age, 
occupation, etc. vary widely across the sample.   
 
6. Estimation Results    
   
  The bivariate probit estimation results are presented in Table 2. We show three estimation 
results based on different specifications in order to check the robustness of the results. The signs of 
most coefficients are consistent across different specifications, including the variables for three 
main hypotheses of FN adoption factors, i.e., risk aversion, credit constraint, and learning effect. 
The robustness of our model is verified based on the consistency of the estimation results. 
  Our discussion is based on the result of the specification (3) in Table 3, in which we 
employed income and asset variables as identifying instrumental variables for the credit constraint 
equation of a household. The coefficient correlation of disturbances,   , for this specification (3) is  
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-0.831 with standard of error of 0.085. The Wald test of null hypothesis,   = 0, is rejected at the 1% 
significant level. This supports the validity of employing the bivariate probit model for estimation. 
The negative sign of the    coefficient indicates that an unobservable factor that shifts a household 
toward credit constraints and an unobservable factor that promotes FN adoption are inversely 
correlated. 
  According to the FN investment model results of the specification (3) in Table 2, all of the 
three hypotheses are supported statistically. First, the coefficient of the risk aversion variable is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, implying that when households become more risk averse, 
they are less likely to adopt FN. Second, the credit accessibility variable has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. This result indicates that when a household loses credit 
accessibility, it decreases the probability of adopting FN significantly.  
  Finally, with respect to the learning effects, several findings emerged from the estimations. 
First, the estimated coefficient of the number of successful FN owners known by the household has 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This result strongly supports the social learning 
hypothesis, i.e. when household knows more people who are successful in the FN business, it raises 
the probability of their adopting FN. Second, the coefficient of the year dummy becomes gradually 
larger in the later years, especially in 1999 and 2000, implying that the accumulated experiences in 
the whole area had positive effects on individual-level FN adoptions. Across the whole Saguling 
reservoir area, villages have accumulated expertise in the FN business. As we have seen in the 
model framework of equation (2), if learning has positive effect, then later years would raise the 
probability of adopting FN. Attending FN trainings also raises the probability of adopting FN 
significantly. Other variables such as household education level also raise the likelihood of FN 
adoption. 
  In Table 2, the results of the credit constraint equations are also consistent with theoretical 
predictions. Higher education, larger income and greater land assets decrease the likelihood of 
household being credit constrained. Households in village A are less likely to be credit constrained,  
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and this fact may explain the reasons why people in village A became more active in FN than those 
in village B.   
  Table 3 shows the marginal effects of the marginal probability of credit constraints and FN 
adoption when the independent variables are at their means. The strongest marginal effect for 
adopting FN appears to be generated by credit constrained dummy. The credit accessibility 
enhances the probably of adopting FN by 3.91%, whose coefficient is the largest coefficient among 
all the variables. Similarly, a household with one unit lower risk aversion has a 2.96% higher 
probability of FN adoption, and one  which attended a training session has a 1.24% higher 
probability. 
  However, the learning effect from others’ success seems to have a very small marginal effect. 
Even knowing 100 successful FN people only raises the likelihood of FN adoption by 2%. The 
learning effect from others is smaller than the credit constraint or risk attitude. The variable 
resettled only raises the probability of adopting FN by 0.03 %. Although the FN aquaculture was 
aimed at resettled people, they did not really benefit from it. Among the marginal probabilities for 
credit constraint of a household, it appears that the most important variable is risk attitude.    
 
7. Conclusion   
 
  Our bivariate probit results suggest that credit constraint, risk attitudes, and social learning all 
affect the Indonesian household’s decision to adopt the new FN technology and the results are 
highly robust. Among other things, our statistical tests showed that credit constraints act as a 
serious constraint for households to adopt FN. This is fully consistent with the anecdotal evidence 
from the field, i.e., without capital, there is no way to implement FN. Our results are also in 
accordance with the findings of the previous Saguling studies that the poor could not have 
benefited due to a lack of access to capital (Manatunge et al, 1999). 
  Our findings provide important policy implications not only for rural Indonesia but also for  
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other areas in similar situations. First, when introducing and promoting a new technology such as 
aquaculture, which requires a high initial fixed investment cost, supplementary programs that ease 
credit constraints are important to the successful adoption of the new technology. Reducing the 
burden of obtaining credit is indispensable especially if the program is targeted to the poor since 
our results showed that credit constrained households typically own less land assets and have lower 
income. Some studies suggest that the poorest may not have benefited from FN due to their 
inability to secure ownership of the FN cages (Manatunge et al, 1999). The poor’s credit 
accessibility seems to be the key to improving their current situation. 
  The recent trend to focus on micro credit schemes in developing countries is in accord with 
this finding. Although Indonesia has a long history of micro-finance and various micro credit 
schemes (Robinson, 2002), the surveyed villages did not seem to benefit fully from these programs. 
There were hardly any organizations involved in these villages for providing micro credit. In 
Indonesia, improvements in credit accessibility has been recognized as one of the most critical 
issues in development projects as evidenced by the Indonesian government launching micro credit 
programs in late 1990’s in cooperation with the World Bank
4. While our results strongly support 
this policy direction, formal recognition of credit limitations as a primary issue is only beginning to 
emerge at the national level. Second, providing opportunities for local people to attend various 
training programs, obtain technical assistance, or consult with experienced participants would help 






                                                   
4  For example, there has been a nationwide project called 'Kecamatan Development Project' in Indonesia supported by 
IBRD and IDA. The project includes micro credit lent to village group members for working capital.    
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Mean  Standard. 
Deviation 
Dependent variable     
FN adoption dummy (adopted=1)  0.12  0.33 
     
Independent variables     
Number of members in a Household  3.96  1.76 
Age of respondent  41.23  13.55 
Village dummy (Village A=1, B=0)  0.69  0.46 
Resettled dummy (resettled=1)  0.30  0.46 
Respondent’s years of schooling  5.82  2.95 
Highest years of schooling in Household  7.02  2.93 
Monthly income (Rupiah)  89397.98  327048.40 
House land (m
2)  165.95  231.61 
Farm land (m
2)  242.61  1219.89 
Estimated degree of risk aversion    -1.02  0.35 
Credit Constrained dummy (yes=1)  0.85  0.36 
Number of Successful FN ownerFN training 
dummy (attended=1) 
1.350.62  5.170.24 
Number of Successful FN owner  1.35  5.17 
     
Number of valid observations  5254    
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Table 2    
Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Household Credit Constraint and FN Adoption 
 

















Variable Definition  Name  cc  Std. error  v 
Std. 
error  cc 
Std. 
error  v 
Std. 
error 
   
 
   
        
Number of household member  Numhh  0.167  (0.02)***  -0.385  (0.05)***  0.167  (0.19)***  -0.395  (0.05)*** 
Age of respondent  Age  0.085  (0.01)***  -0.030  (0.005)***  0.079  (0.01)***  0.023  (0.03) 
Age squared divided by 100  Age2_100  -0.075  (0.01)***      -0.069  (0.01)***  -0.063  (0.04) 
Village (A=1, B=0)  Village  -0.247  (0.06)***  0.426  (0.13)***  -0.252  (0.06)***  0.481  (0.13)*** 
Resettled dummy  Resettle  -0.464  (0.06)***  0.069  (0.17)  -0.466  (0.06)***  0.046  (0.15) 
Highest years of schooling  high_edu  -0.139  (0.05)***  0.195  (0.09)**  -0.144  (0.05)***  0.236  (0.10)** 
Highest years of schooling squared    highedu2  0.017  (0.003)***  -0.028  (0.005)***  0.017  (0.003)***  -0.030  (0.01)*** 
Income (in 1,000,000 Rupiah)    Income  -0.414  (0.08)***  -0.149  (0.17)  -0.438  (0.08)***  -   
House land divided by 100  Hslnd100  -0.103  (0.01)***  0.008  (0.03)  -0.101  (0.01)***  -   
Farm land divided by 100  Farm100  0.003  (0.003)  0.014  (0.005)***  0.005  (0.003)  -   
Respondent’s risk aversion    Risk  2.515  (0.13)***  -4.812  (0.45)***  2.502  (0.13)***  -4.807  (0.34)*** 
Credit constrained (yes=1)  Cc      -1.097  (0.58)*      -1.301  (0.45)*** 
FN training dummy, (attended =1)  Fn_train      0.648  (0.21)***      0.742  (0.19)*** 
Number of successful FN owner  Success      0.033  (0.01)***      0.036  (0.01)*** 
year  1986  Yr2  0.216  (0.18)  -0.018  (0.36)  0.218  (0.18)  -0.002  (0.37) 
year  1987  Yr3  0.096  (0.17)  0.046  (0.33)  0.097  (0.17)  0.052  (0.35) 
year  1988  Yr4  0.185  (0.17)  0.070  (0.34)  0.186  (0.17)  0.062  (0.35) 
year  1989  Yr5  0.202  (0.17)  0.037  (0.34)  0.201  (0.17)  0.039  (0.36) 
year  1990  Yr6  0.066  (0.16)  0.455  (0.32)  0.066  (0.16)  0.464  (0.33) 
year  1991  Yr7  0.079  (0.16)  0.528  (0.32)  0.079  (0.16)  0.542  (0.33) 
year    1992  Yr8  0.014  (0.16)  0.587  (0.31)*  0.016  (0.16)  0.615  (0.32)* 
year  1993  Yr9  -0.007  (0.16)  0.582  (0.32)*  -0.003  (0.16)  0.625  (0.33)* 
year  1994  Yr10  0.013  (0.16)  0.721  (0.33)**  0.017  (0.16)  0.757  (0.33)** 
year  1995  Yr11  -0.092  (0.15)  0.607  (0.30)**  -0.089  (0.15)  0.609  (0.31)* 
year  1996  Yr12  -0.086  (0.15)  0.510  (0.30)*  -0.084  (0.15)  0.523  (0.31)* 
year  1997  Yr13  -0.067  (0.15)  0.349  (0.30)  -0.063  (0.15)  0.336  (0.31) 
year  1998  Yr14  0.038  (0.16)  0.575  (0.32)*  0.043  (0.16)  0.597  (0.32)* 
year    1999  Yr15  0.042  (0.16)  0.918  (0.34)***  0.047  (0.16)  0.961  (0.33)*** 
year  2000  Yr16  -0.073  (0.16)  0.837  (0.33)**  -0.072  (0.16)  0.915  (0.33)*** 
Constant  Constant  1.705  (0.33)***  -4.505  (0.51)***  1.842  (0.33)***  -5.620  (0.87)*** 
r        -0.867    (0.10) **     -0.831 (0.09)*** 
   Note: Result is based on 4946 Observations (Standard error in Parentheses).   





Marginal Effects on the Marginal and Joint Probability of 
Household Credit Constraint and FN Adoption Model 
Name    Pr[cc =1]  Pr[v =1]     
Reference probability  0.9237  0.0019 
     
Numhh  0.0240  -0.0024 
Age  0.0113  0.0001 
Age2_100  -0.0098  -0.0004 
Village  -0.0336  0.0024 
Resettle  0.0770  0.0003 
High_edu  -0.0206  0.0015 
Highedu2  0.0024  -0.0002 
Income  -0.0628   
Hslnd100  -0.0145   
Farm100  0.0007   
Risk  0.3589  -0.0296 
Cc    -0.0391 
Fn_train    0.0124 
Success    0.0002 
Yr2  0.0272  0.0000 
Yr3  0.0131  0.0003 
Yr4  0.0236  0.0004 
Yr5  0.0254  0.0003 
Yr6  0.0091  0.0053 
Yr7  0.0108  0.0069 
Yr8  0.0022  0.0087 
Yr9  -0.0004  0.0089 
Yr10  0.0024  0.0130 
Yr11  -0.0135  0.0085 
Yr12  -0.0127  0.0065 
Yr13  -0.0094  0.0032 
Yr14  0.0060  0.0082 
Yr15  0.0066  0.0216 
Yr16  -0.0108  0.0195 
Yr16  -0.0108  0.0195 
                       Note : Marginal effects based on equation (2) in Table 2 
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